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Abstract
As interaction between autonomous
agents, communication can be analyzed
in game-theoretic terms. Meaning game
is proposed to formalize the core of
intended communication in which the
sender sends a message and the re-
ceiver attempts to infer its meaning in-
tended by the sender. Basic issues in-
volved in the game of natural language
communication are discussed, such as
salience, grammaticality, common sense,
and common belief, together with some
demonstration of the feasibility of game-
theoretic account of language.
1 Introduction
Communication is a game (interaction among au-
tonomous agents) by definition. So it can be ana-
lyzed in game-theoretic terms.1 In this paper we
study a fundamental aspect of linguistic commu-
nication from the point of view of game theory,
and enumerate some basic issues involved in the
communication games of natural language.
Let I be the proposition that the sender S in-
tends to communicate a semantic content c to the
receiver R. Then I entails that S intends that
R should both recognize c and believe I. This
is the core of nonnatural meaning (Grice, 1957;
Grice, 1969). Grice’s original notion of nonnatu-
ral meaning further entails (S’s intention of) R’s
believing (when c is a proposition or a reference)
or obeying (when it is an order or a request) c,
but we disregard this aspect and concentrate on
this core.
This restricted sense of nonnatural meaning im-
plies that communication is inherently collabora-
tive, because both S and R want that R should
recognize c and I. S of course wants it, and so
does R because it is beneficial in general to know
what S intends to make R believe or obey. S
might be lying or trying to mislead R, but even in
1See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), among oth-
ers, for general reference on game theory.
such a case S is still intending to communicate a
content c by way of making R recognize this inten-
tion. Even if R doubts S’s honesty, R will try to
know what c is, because knowing what c is would
help R infer what the hidden intent of S may be,
among others. For instance, when S tells R that
it is raining, R will learn that S wants to make R
believe that it is raining. R would do so even if R
knew that it is not raining. Even if R were unsin-
cere and misunderstood S’s message on purpose,2
the nonnatural meaning is still properly conveyed,
because otherwise the intended misunderstanding
would be impossible.
The present study concerns this aspect of com-
munication, the nonnatural meaning in the re-
stricted sense, which is a core of intended commu-
nication. Lies, ironies, indirect speech acts, and so
forth (Perrault, 1990; Perrault and Allen, 1980)
all share this core. Our understanding about it
will hence help us understand basic workings of
natural communication systems. As an example,
centering theory (Grosz et al., 1995) could be at-
tributed to game-theoretic accounts, as demon-
strated later in this paper.
2 Communication Games
Communication has been discussed in the game-
theory literature. A signaling game consists of
sender S’s sending a message (or a signal) to re-
ceiver R and R’s doing some action in response
to that message. Here S knows something that R
did not know before receiving the message. This
is formulated by assuming that S belongs to some
type, which S knows but R does not know at first.
Let T be the set of the types, P be the proba-
bility distribution over T . Let M be the set of
the messages and A be the set of R’s possible
actions. Finally, let UX be the utility function
for player X . US(t,m, a) and UR(t,m, a) are real
numbers for t ∈ T , m ∈ M and a ∈ A. A signal-
ing game with T = {t1, t2}, M = {m1,m2} and
A = {a1, a2} is illustrated by a game tree as shown
in Figure 1. Here the game proceeds downwards.
2If R is sincere and unintentionally misunder-
stands, that is just a failure of sharing the same con-
t1
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m2
a1 a2
Figure 1: A signaling game.
The top branch is the nature’s initial choice of S’s
type according to P , the middle layer is S’s de-
cision on which message to send, and finally the
bottom layer is R’s choice of her action. When R
has just received mi (i = 1, 2), she does not know
whether the game has been played through t1 or
t2.
Let σS and σR be S’s and R’s strategies,
3 re-
spectively. That is, σS(m|t) is the conditional
probability of S’s sending message m provided
that she is of type t, and σR(a|m) the conditional
probability of R’s doing action a provided that
she has received m. The combination 〈σS , σR〉
of strategies is an equilibrium4 of a signaling game
when σS and σR are the optimal responses to each
other; that is, when σX maximizes X ’s expected
utility
∑
t,m,a
P (t)σS(m|t)σR(a|m)UX(t,m, a)
given σY , for both X = S ∧ Y = R and X =
R ∧ Y = S.
In typical applications of signaling game, T , M
and A are not discrete sets as in the above ex-
ample but connected subsets of real numbers, and
S’s preference for R’s action is the same irrespec-
tive of her type. In this setting, S should send a
costly message to get a large payoff. For instance,
in job market signaling (Spence, 1973), a worker S
signals her competence (type) to a potential em-
ployer R with the level of her education as the
message, and R decides the amount of salary to
offer to S. A competent worker will have high
education and the employer will offer her a high
salary. In mate selection (Zahavi, 1975), a deer
S indicates its strength by the size of its antlers
text with S.
3Or mixed strategies, which are probability distri-
butions over the simple strategies (actions).
4Or complete Bayesian equilibrium, in a more pre-
cise, technical term.
to potential mates R. A strong deer will grow ex-
tra large antlers to demonstrate its extra survival
competence with this handicap.
Cheap-talk game is another sort of communi-
cation game. It is a special case of signaling
game where US and UR do not depend on the
message; that is, composing/sending and receiv-
ing/interpreting message are free of cost. In a
cheap-talk game, S’s preference for R’s action
must depend on her type for non-trivial commu-
nication to obtain, because otherwise S’s message
would give no information to R about her type.
3 Meaning Game
Now we want to formulate the notion of mean-
ing game to capture nonnatural meaning in the
restricted sense discussed in Section 1. Let C be
the set of semantic contents and P the probability
distribution over the linguistic reference to the se-
mantic contents. That is, P (c) is the probability
that S intends to communicate semantic content
c to R. As before, M is the set of the messages.
A meaning game addresses a turn of communi-
cation 〈cS ,m, cR〉, which stands for a course of
events where S, intending to communicate a se-
mantic content cS , sends a message m to R and R
interprets m as meaning cR. cS = cR is a neces-
sary condition for this turn of communication to
be successful. It seems reasonable to assume that
the success of communication is the only source of
positive utility for any player.
So a meaning game might be a sort of signaling
game in which S’s type stands for her intending
to communicate some semantic content, and R’s
action is to infer some semantic content. That
is, both T and A could be simply regarded as C.
Strategies σS and σR are defined accordingly.
In a simple formulation, the utility function UX
of player X would thus be a real-valued function
from C ×M × C (the set of turns). It would be
sensible to assume that UX(cS ,m, cR) > 0 holds
only if cS = cR. UX reflects the grammar of the
language (which might be private to S or R to var-
ious degrees). The grammar evaluates the (com-
putational, among others) cost of using content-
message pairs. The more costly are 〈cS ,m〉 and
〈m, cR〉, the smaller is UX(cS ,m, cR). The notion
of equilibria in a meaning game is naturally de-
rived from that in a signaling game.
If the players want something like common
belief,5 however, meaning games are not signaling
games. This is because cS = cR is not a suffi-
cient condition for the success of communication
in that case. UX should then depend on not just
cS , m, and cR, but also the players’ nested beliefs
about each other. We will come back to this issue
in Section 4.
5People have common belief of proposition p when
they all believe p, they all believe that they all believe
p, they all believe that they all believe that they all
believe p, and so on, ad infinitum.
Note also that the typical instances of meaning
game in natural language communication is not
like the typical applications of signaling game such
as mentioned before, even if meaning games are
special sort of signaling games. That is, meaning
games in natural language would normally involve
discrete sets of semantic contents and messages.
Natural-languagemeaning games are not cheap-
talk games, either, because we must take into con-
sideration the costs of content-message pairs. It
is not just the success of communication but also
various other factors that account for the players’
utility. S and R hence do not just want to maxi-
mize the probability of successful communication.
To illustrate a meaning game and to demon-
strate that meaning games are not cheap-talk
games, let us consider the following discourse.
(1) u1: Fred scolded Max.
u2: He was angry with the man.
The preferred interpretation of ‘he’ and ‘the man’
in u2 are Fred and Max, respectively, rather than
the contrary. This preference is accounted for by
the meaning game as shown in Figure 2. In this
probability: P1
Fred
‘he’
utility: U1
‘the man’
> U2
> P2
Max
Figure 2: A meaning game about references of
NPs.
game, Fred and Max are semantic contents, and
‘he’ and ‘the man’ are messages.6 We have omit-
ted the nature’s selection among the semantic con-
tents. Also, the nodes with the same label are col-
lapsed to one. S’s choice goes downward and R’s
choice upward, without their initially knowing the
other’s choice. The complete bipartite connection
between the contents and the messages means that
either message can mean either content grammat-
ically (without too much cost).
P1 and P2 are the prior probabilities of refer-
ences to Fred and Max in u2, respectively. Since
Fred was referred to by the subject and Max by
the object in u1, Fred is considered more salient
than Max in u2. This is captured by assuming
P1 > P2. U1 and U2 are the utility (negative
cost) of using ‘he’ and ‘the man,’ respectively.7
Utilities are basically assigned to content-message
6Perhaps there are other semantic contents and
messages.
7For the sake of simplicity, here we assume that US
and UR are equal. See Section 4 for discussion.
pairs, but sometimes it is possible to consider costs
of messages irrespective of their contents. We as-
sume U1 > U2 to the effect that ‘he’ is less com-
plex than ‘the man’ both phonologically and se-
mantically; ‘he’ is not only shorter than ‘the man’
but also, more importantly, less meaningful in the
sense that it lacks the connotation of being adult
which ‘the man’ has.
There are exactly two equilibria entailing 100%
success of communication, as depicted in Figure 3
with their expected utilities E1 and E2 apart from
the utility of success of communication.8 P1 > P2
Fred
‘he’
Max
‘the man’
Fred
‘the man’
Max
‘he’
E1 = P1U1 + P2U2 E2 = P1U2 + P2U1
Figure 3: Two equilibria of the meaning game in
Figure 2.
and U1 > U2 imply E1−E2 = (P1−P2)(U1−U2) >
0. So the equilibrium in the left-hand side is
preferable for both S and R, or Pareto superior.
This explains the preference in (1). It is straight-
forward to generalize this result for cases with
more than two contents and messages: A more
salient content should be referred to by a lighter
message when the combinations between the con-
tents and the messages are complete. A general
conjecture we might draw from this discussion is
the following.
(2) Natural-language meaning games are played
at their Pareto-optimal equilibria.
An equilibrium is Pareto optimal iff no other equi-
librium is Pareto superior to it.
Note that we have derived an essence of
centering theory (Joshi and Weinstein, 1981;
Kameyama, 1986; Walker et al., 1994; Grosz et al.,
1995). Centering theory is to explain anaphora
in natural language. It considers list Cf(ui) of
forward-looking centers, which are the semantic
entities realized9 in ui, where ui is the i-th utter-
ance. The forward-looking centers of utterance u
are ranked in Cf(u) according to their saliences.
8Common belief about the communicated content
is always obtained in both cases. So the current dis-
cussion does not depend on whether the success of
communication is defined by cS = cR or common
belief.
9A linguistic expression realizes a semantic content
when the former directly refers to the latter or the
situation described by the former involves the latter.
For instance, after an utterance of ‘a house,’ ‘the door’
realizes the house referred to by ‘a house.’
In English, this ranking is determined by gram-
matical functions of the expressions in the utter-
ance, as below.
subject > direct object > indirect object
> other complements > adjuncts
The highest-ranked element of Cf(u) is called
the preferred center of U and written Cp(u).
Backward-looking center Cb(ui) of utterance ui
is the highest-ranked element of Cf(ui−1) that
is realized in ui. Cb(u) is the entity which the
discourse is most centrally concerned with at u.
Centering theory stipulates the following rule.
(3) If an element of Cf(ui−1) is realized by a pro-
noun in ui, then so is Cb(ui).
In (1), Cb(u2) = Fred because Cf(u1) = [Fred,
Max], if either ‘he’ or ‘the man’ refers to Fred.
Then rule (3) predicts that Fred cannot be realized
by ‘the man’ if Max is realized by ‘he’ — the same
prediction that we derived above. Moreover, (3)
itself is a special instance of our above observation
that a more salient content should be referred to
by a lighter message, provided that the backward-
looking center is particularly salient.
(3) is common in all the version of centering
theory, but of course there are further details of
the theory, which vary from one version to an-
other. To derive all of them (which are right) in a
unified manner requires further extensive study.
4 Playing the Same Game
We have so far assumed implicitly that S and R
have common knowledge about (the rule of) the
game (that is, P , US and UR). This assump-
tion will be justified as a practical approximation
in typical applications of signaling games (and
cheap-talk games). For instance, there may well
be a body of roughly correct, stable common-sense
knowledge about the correlation between the com-
petence of workers and the degree of effort they
make to have higher education, about how much
an employer will offer to an employee with a cer-
tain competence, and so on.
However, common knowledge on the game
might be harder to obtain in natural-language
meaning games, because the game lacks such sta-
bility of the typical signaling games as mentioned
above. A natural-language meaning game is al-
most equivalent to the context of discourse, which
changes dynamically as the discourse unfolds.
In general, to figure out her own best strategy,
S (R) attempts to infer R’s (S’s) strategy by sim-
ulating R’s (S’s) inference. If S and R do not have
common knowledge about the game, this inference
will constitute an infinite tree.10 For instance,
Figure 4 depicts S’s inference when she wants to
10This is not a game tree but a tree of belief
embedding.
communicate c1, where the players have common
knowledge of C = {c1, c2} andM = {m1,m2} but
not of their utility functions. The nodes labeled
by ci represent S when she wants to communicate
ci, and those labeled by mi represent R when she
wants to interpret mi, for i = 1, 2. The inference
by R when interpreting message mi is a similar
tree rooted by mi.
Although it is impossible to actually have com-
mon knowledge in general (Halpern and Moses,
1990), there are several motivations for the play-
ers to pretend to have common knowledge about
the game. First, they can avoid the computational
complexity in dealing with infinite trees such as
above. Second, common belief on the game is
a simple means to obtain common belief on the
communicated content. Third, the best payoff is
obtained when the players have common knowl-
edge about the game, if their utility functions are
equal. In fact, the utility functions are proba-
bly equal, because language use as a whole is a
repeated game. That is, provided that commu-
nicating agents play the role of S and R half of
the time each, they can maximize their expected
utility by setting their utility functions to the av-
erage of their selfish utilities. Fortunately, this
equalization is very stable, as long as the success
of communication is the only source of positive
utility for both the players.
In communication games, common knowledge
on which message S has sent should help the
players converge on common belief on the game.
That is, when the players have common knowl-
edge that message m was sent, they may be able
to detect errors in their embedded beliefs. In fact,
an embedded belief turns out wrong if it implies
σS(m|c) = 0 for every c in the embedded context.
This common knowledge about m may be even
incorporated in the meaning game. That is, it
may affect the cost of retrieving or composing var-
ious content-message pairs, thus biasing the scope
of the game towards those content-message pairs
closely associated with m. Contents and messages
very difficult to envisage given m will be virtually
excluded from the game. Once the game is de-
fined, however, both players must take into con-
sideration the entire maximal connected subgraph
containing the content she wants to convey or the
message she wants to interpret.
5 Composite Game
Natural-language communication is a composite
game in two senses. First, as mentioned in the
previous section, it is considered a repeated game,
which is a sequence of smaller games. Second,
each such smaller game is a compound game con-
sisting of temporally overlapping meaning games.
These facts introduce several complications into
the communication game.
In a repeated game, one stage may affect the
subsequent stage. In natural-language communi-
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...
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Figure 4: Inference by S to communicate semantic content c1.
cation, a meaning game can influence the next
meaning game. For instance, if a semantic con-
tent c is referred to by a message with a low cost,
then the probability of reference to c may increase
as a sort of accommodation,11 because a reference
by a lightweight message presupposes high prior
probability of reference, as discussed in Section 3.
For instance, a reference to Fred by ‘he’ will raise
the salience of Fred.
Another type of contextual effect shows up the
following discourse.
(4) u1: Fred scolded Max.
u2: The man was angry with him.
Here ‘the man’ and ‘he’ in u2 are more readily
interpreted as Fred and Max, respectively, which
violates (3) and hence our game-theoretic account.
This preference is accounted for by the prefer-
ence for parallelism concerning the combination
of semantic content and grammatical function: In
both u1 and u2 Fred is realized by the subject
NP and Max is realized by the object NP. This is
the same sort of preference that is addressed by
property-sharing constraint (Kameyama, 1986).
This effect is attributed to the utility assignment
as shown in Figure 5. That is, the utility U1 of
associating the proposition angry(Fred,Max) (that
Fred is angry with Max) with the sentence ‘The
man was angry with him’ is greater than the util-
ity U2 of associating angry(Max,Fred) (the propo-
sition that Max is angry with Fred) with the same
sentence. This game might involve other possible
associations such as that between angry(Max,Fred)
11Lewis (1979) discusses several types of accommo-
dation for conversational score, of which the most rel-
evant here is accommodation for comparative salience:
x becomes more salient than y when something is said
which presupposes x to be more salient than y.
probability: P1
angry(Fred,Max)
‘The man was angry with him’
utility: U1 > U2
≃ P2
angry(Max,Fred)
Figure 5: A meaning game about propositions and
sentences.
and ‘The man made him angry,’ but as mentioned
at the end of Section 4 contents and messages
other than included in Figure 5 probably accom-
pany great costs and hence may be neglected.
In general, several meaning games are played
possibly in parallel during linguistic communica-
tion using a compound expression. A turn of com-
munication with an utterance of ‘the man was an-
gry with him’ consists of the sentence-level game
mentioned above, the two noun phrase-level games
— one concerning the subject NP (shown in Fig-
ure 2) and the other the object NP of ‘with’ —
and so on. A strategy of each player in such
a compound game associated with a compound
expression is a combination of her strategies for
all such constituent games. Each player attempts
to maximize the expected utility over the entire
compound game, rather than for each constituent
game.
Different constituent games often interact. For
instance, if the speaker chooses to say ‘the man’
for the subject NP, then the whole sentence can-
not be ‘he was angry with the man.’ So a global
solution, which maximizes the utility from the en-
tire game, may maximize the utility from some
constituent games but not from others. In the
above example, the global solution, which involves
saying ‘the man was angry with him’ and inter-
preting it as angry(Fred,Max), maximizes the util-
ity from the sentence-level game but not from the
NP-level games. Incidentally, the players will gain
greater utility if they use the combination of an-
gry(Fred,Max) and ‘he was angry with the man,’
which is consistent with the optimal equilibrium
of the NP-games. When ‘the man was angry with
him’ is used despite the smaller default utility as-
sociated with it, Max will probably be assigned a
greater salience than otherwise, which is again a
sort of accommodation.
Extralinguistic context enters sentence-level
games and plays an important role in language
use. For example, if it is known that Max
never gets angry and that Fred is short-tempered,
then both in (1) and (4) the second utterance
will preferably be interpreted as meaning an-
gry(Fred,Max).
6 Conclusion
Meaning game captures nonnatural meaning in
the restricted sense which obtains in basically
all the cases of natural-language communication.
The factors which define a meaning game include
grammatical function, reference by lightweight
message, extralinguistic information (these affect
P ), grammar, cost of recalling (these affect the
utility), and so on. To have a more complete
game-theoretic account of natural language, we
need a quantitative characterization of how those
factors contribute to the game.
We have almost restricted ourselves to refer-
ences of nouns phrases, but the seemingly promis-
ing targets of game-theoretic account of natural
language apparently include binding theory, con-
versational implicature (Parikh, 1992), and so on.
Since our account is very general in nature, how-
ever, it should apply to language as a whole. For
instance, the notion of grammaticality may well
be attributed to the computational difficulty in
convergence to a common game-theoretic equilib-
rium. Also, abductive inference involved in lan-
guage understanding (Hobbs et al., 1993) (hence
in language production, too, from the game-
theoretic, reciprocal viewpoint) is closely related
with our theory. That is, the particular usefulness
of abduction in natural language communication
could be ascribed to the fact that language use in
essence is a collaborative interaction such as dis-
cussed so far.
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